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According to Paulus, coinage originated from the need for a common medium of exchange. 
To fill this need a materia was chosen the enduring value of which was generally recognized 
(publica ac perpetua aestimatio). This materia was stamped by a public design (forma 
publica), to be used not so much ex substantia … quam ex quantitate.1 Monetary value was 
created by the forma publica and was by definition a legal construct, creating the enforceable 
obligation to accept coins ‘bearing the imperial portrait’. Although coinage required a 
valuable substance as bearer, the forma publica was not intended to guarantee the commodity 
value of this substance.2 
The ambivalence of coinage as currency combining intrinsic and nominal value continues to 
set the terms of the debate today. Money in the ancient world, is still seen primarily as coined 
metal: materia subjected to legal norms regarding weight, size, purity, form, design, 
production and use. The debate still turns on the question how important the contribution of 
coins’ metal value was to uphold purchasing power and face value. 
The distinction between ‘money’ and ‘currency’ is mostly limited to the role of checks and 
bank money. The difference, however, is more fundamental and crucial to a proper 
understanding of how currency functioned. The essence of money is the social 
institutionalisation of its primary tokens (whether coins, cowrie shells, bullion, bank notes or 
anything else). ‘Money’ exists qua money only when the acceptance of its tokens as tokens 
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(and not for instance as bullion in the case of metal coins) in exchange for goods and services 
is taken for granted.3 These institutional aspects are money’s deepest soul and secret, No 
monetary system can survive if the acceptance of its tokens is not self-evident. 
There are always three interrelated sides to a developed monetary system. The first and most 
visible are the material and immaterial aspects of money tokens. The second is that of the 
socialised mind, taught to accept as self evident the value of money tokens. The third is that 
of the norms and regulations imposed on money tokens by a political authority. The socialised 
mind is used to a specific form of monetary system, embodied in official regulations and 
material aspects. Intrinsic values and legal tender may (or may not) be required, but these are 
largely backup systems; comforting reassurances against doubt. 
Currency 
The silver denarius was the central denomination in the Roman coinage system for over 400 
years (211 BCE – 238 CE). Nero debased it slightly (reducing its weight standard from 1/84 
to 1/96 pound, and its purity from ca. 98% to ca. 93.5%). Over the next 90-odd years the 
silver content diminished to ca. 90%. Marcus Aurelius again cut purity by ca. 10%. The 
following 50 years the decline continued. By the time of Caracalla purity had fallen to ca. 
50%. The last denarii struck under Gordian III contained ca. 48% silver and were 
considerably underweight. 
It remains a point of debate whether the public was aware of this evolution. There were no 
reliable non-destructive assay techniques for silver in the ancient world. The surface of 
denarii-flans since Nero was artificially enriched, so Gordian’s last denarii looked as ‘fine’ as 
ever.4 Average weight declined under the Severans, but weight variations between specimens 
of the same silver coin types had always been large without demonstrable effects on 
circulation patterns.5 
Nevertheless, ‘you can’t fool all of the people all of the time’. The debasement of the silver 
coinage could not be hidden from assayers and bankers. Through them, the general public 
must have been able to know – if they cared. 
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The introduction of the antoninianus in 215 tariffed at 2 denarii but weighing only 1.5, 
betrays the confidence the imperial administration had that its manipulations would be 
accepted. It was a handsome coin, even though it contained less than 50% silver. There was 
little enthusiasm at first and its production was stopped after a few years. But its 
reintroduction in 238 on a massive scale and the near simultaneous abandoning of the 
denarius production doesn’t appear to have caused much concern. The appearance of 
antoniniani together with denarii in hoards confirms the trust they inspired.6  
Its average weight declined from 4.5 g to a little under 4 g under Decius, but this was masked 
by the traditionally wide margins allowed for silver coin. However, in the 250’s and 260’s the 
antoninianus rapidly deteriorated in silver content and weight to a miserable shadow of its 
former self.7 
The Egyptian monetary system was long dominated by the base silver tetradrachms (13 g, ca. 
16% silver) introduced by Nero in 64 CE, officially equated to 1 denarius.8 In 176/7 Marcus 
Aurelius issued a small emission of under weight further debased tetradrachms (ca. 12 g, ca. 
8% silver), which Commodus adopted as his new standard. From the 180’s until ca. 250 this 
‘commodian’ standard was followed and although output decreased, it was well respected 
until the sole reign of Gallienus (260 CE). From then on the Alexandrian tetradrachms 
suffered the same rapid deterioration as the antoninianus.9 
The most innovative feature of the Augustan system, was the regularity and abundance of its 
gold currency.10 Aurei had a face value of 25 denarii and the Pompeian evidence shows that 
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although gold coins were relatively rare (2.34% of the money supply), their face value was 
huge (60.70% of the total).11 
The purity of the aureus remained unaffected until the mid 3rd century. Antonine and early 
Severan gold was metrologically indistinguishable from Nero’s post-reform gold, introduced 
in 64 CE. Gold currency consisted almost exclusively of aurei minted with great accuracy at 
45 to the pound, 7.2 g. Aurei from Antoninus Pius in the British Museum weigh an average 
7.23 g, with a VarCo of only 2.2%, only 3.5% deviate more than 5% from the average. 
Caracalla’s pre-debased aurei weigh an average 7.29 g, with a VarCo of 2.2%, only 2.3% 
deviate more than 5% from the average. Output plummeted after Marcus Aurelius, but the 
stock of aurei minted between 64 and 215 CE was huge and dominated the total supply until 
at least the mid 3rd c. 
In 215 Caracalla reduced the weight standard to 1/50 of a pound (average 6.57 g), which was 
followed until Alexander Severus. Initially quality control was very strict (none of Caracalla’s 
debased aurei deviate more than 5% from the average), but it soon slackened. Average weight 
of Alexander’s aurei is 6.39 g. VarCo has risen to 6.2%. 33.3% deviate more than 5% from 
the average, 11.1% even more than 10%. 
Maximinus Thrax virtually abandoned gold coinage. Gordian III resumed it at a much lower 
standard and at more erratic weights. The average weight of his aurei is 4.89 g with a VarCo 
of 5.8 %; 40% deviate more than 5%, 7.1% deviate more 10%. Philip’s aurei weigh an 
average 4.62 g, VarCo is 7%; 39.4% deviate more than 5%, 15.2% more than 10%. 
Since Gallus gold was minted at so widely different weights, that it is impossible to recognise 
any ‘standard’ any more. Most specimens weigh less than 4 grams. Occasionally heavy aurei 
were minted and radiates that were presumably intended as double-aurei. Valerian took the 
final step of downgrading the purity sometimes down to ca. 65%.12 
Some improvement was made under Aurelian – who restored purity to 98% – but 
metrological accuracy remained a distant dream. The mint of Mediolanum in 271 minted at an 
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average of 4.53 g, with a VarCo of 10.1%, 58% deviate more than 10%. The Roman mint in 
274 minted at 4.42 g with a VarCo of 9.1%, with ‘only’ 22.9% deviating more than 10%.13 
This situation continued until Diocletian’s reforms 293-294 restored metrological accuracy, 
based on an aureus of 1/60 pound. None deviate more than 5%. 
We don’t know what the impact was of these metrologically inferior issues. Stray finds 
suggest output was small, but their reliability is limited. Aurei from Aurelian were rare before 
two new large hoards showed that output was higher than thought possible.14 The absence of 
3rd c. gold in hoards may reflect Gresham’s law: ‘bad’ gold circulated, ‘good’ gold was 
hoarded. Taxes were paid preferably in ‘bad’ gold, flowing back into the mint’s melting pots, 
while good gold remained hidden in private treasuries. 
Aurei seem to have been mounted in jewellery more often than before and hoarded with other 
gold artefacts. This might indicate that (better) gold coins ceased to have a significant surplus 
value over gold bullion.15 But this could easily be caused by a small increase in the price of 
bullion.  
The effects on the functionality of the currency system, may have been limited. Whereas 
silver currency served primarily as an everyday means of payment, gold coin had always been 
more prestigious and was favoured particularly for gifts signifying special esteem.16 
At a handout in the early 3rd century patroni and quinquennales perpetui of the corpus 
piscinatorum et urinatorum at Rome, received one gold piece each, while the magistrates in 
charge received the formal equivalent of 25 denarii.17 One of the favours Sennius Sollemnis 
received from his ‘friend and patron’ Claudius Paulinus, governor of Britain in 220 CE, was 
that his salary was paid in gold.18 
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 Data from complete sample of R. Göbl R., Die Münzprägung des Kaisers Aurelianus (270/275) 
(Wien 1993); n = 100 for Mediolanum 271, n = 70 for Rome 274. 
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 cf. Göbl 1993, op.cit. (n. 13), 84. 
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 Cf. J.-P. Callu, La politique monétaire des empereurs romains de 238-311 (Paris 1969), 424-430. 
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 S. Mrozek, ‘À propos du “marbre de Thorigny”, salarium in auro (CIL 13, 3162)’, Bulletin de la 
Société Française de Numismatique (1973), 335-336. 
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Les dévaluations à Rome. Vol. I (Actes Rome 1975) (Rome 1978), 85. 
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 CIL 13, 3162. cf. H. Devijver, Prosopographia militiarum equestrium quae fuerunt ab Augusto ad 
Gallienum (Leuven 1976-2001), II 729-730, IV 1718. 
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Aurei set in jewellery or used as pendants elaborate on gold coins’ functionality as status 
tokens, but this does not imply that gold coins in general had lost their functionality as money 
tokens. 
Account money 
Currency was not the only form of money. Thus, army pay was not normally paid in full. The 
army provided a deposit and cashier service to soldiers, which allowed them to buy items 
from the camp’s workshops and storehouses through a simple transfer between accounts.19 
Papyri show it was common for private individuals to deposit money at a bank and to make 
and accepts payments through bankers.20 Bankers in the west disappear from view around the 
middle of the 3rd c.21 In Egypt, however, trapezitai continue to operate throughout the 3rd c., 
although there appears to have been a crisis in the 260’s.  
The continued existence of account money implies that money users had confidence that the 
purchasing power of the coins they received or which were paid out on their behalf was 
roughly that of the coins they deposited. It presupposes ‘monetary’ stability in spite of the 
manifest ‘currency’ instability. 
Gresham’s law 
Denarii from the Flavians and the early Antonines disappear from circulation hoards in the 
late second century (presumably as an effect of reminting), but they continue to appear in 
saving deposits until deep in the 3rd century.22 The occasional appearance of small numbers of 
‘good’ old denarii in hoards consisting almost exclusively of later denarii and antoniniani, 
suggests that saving deposits were brought back into circulation whenever large payments had 
to be made, dowries provided or inheritances divided. 
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 Cf. K. Verboven, ‘Good for business. The Roman army and the emergence of a 'business class' in 
the north-western provinces of the Roman empire’, The Impact of the Roman Army (200 BC – AD 
476): Economic, Social, Political, Religious and Cultural Aspects (Proc. 6th workshop Impact of 
empire. Capri 2005) (in print). 
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 cf. R. Bogaert, ‘Les documents bancaires de l’Égypte gréco-romaine et byzantine’, Ancient Society 
31 (2001), 255-258. 
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 J. Andreau, ‘Declino e morte dei mestieri bancari nel Mediterraneo Occidentale (II-IV D.C.)’, A. 
Giardina (cur.), Società romana e impero tardoantico (Roma – Bari 1986), 601-615, 814-818. 
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 J. Van Heesch, De muntcirculatie tijdens de Romeinse tijd in het Noordwesten van Gallia Belgica. 
De civitates van de Nerviërs en de Menapiërs (ca. 50 v.C. – 450 n. C.) (Brussel 1998), 94-97 ; Callu 
1969, op.cit. (n. 15), 248-187 ; Duncan-Jones 1994, op.cit. (n. 5), 200-205. 
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Dio’s claim that Caracalla ‘adulterated’ the silver and gold coinage may reveal discontent 
over Caracalla’s introduction of the antoninianus and the reduction of the gold standard.23 
Early Severan denarii dominate hoards until Gordian III, while early antoniniani were 
avoided.24 But that does not mean that these circulated at a discount or were avoided as means 
of payment. Until the 250’s antoniniani were still avoided in saving hoards, but they dominate 
circulation hoards. 
Egyptian hoards show that Commodus’s tetradrachms were avoided for saving purposes until 
the sole rule of Gallienus, when they suddenly appear in substantial numbers. Die studies 
suggest that Commodus’ issues were large.25 They mixed in with the mass of ‘neronian’ 
tetradrachms for almost a century. Papyri don’t show a trace of their rejection as means of 
payment.  
These observations are well in line with Gresham’s law, predicting that when coins of a 
reduced silver or gold content are brought into circulation at the same nominal value as coins 
with a significantly higher gold or silver content, the latter will be preferred for savings and 
exports. Gresham’s law is not an indication of primitiveness. Significantly, it presupposes that 
legal tender laws are effective in enforcing the equal face value of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ money.26 
The reduction of the silver content of the US half-dollar in 1965 from 90% pure to 40% drove 
the former out of circulation.27  
Inflation 
Monetarist theory predicts that Gresham’s law provokes inflation because sellers anticipate 
that they will be paid in ‘bad’ money and raise their prices in response. However, it now 
seems almost certain that such a ‘monetary’ inflation did not occur before at least the second 
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 Dio, Historiae Romanae 78.14.4.  
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 Wolters 1999, op.cit. (n. 1), 380-381. 
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 Christiansen 2004, op.cit. (n. 3), 108-109. 
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 Cf. A. J. Rolnick and W. E. Weber, ‘Gresham's Law or Gresham's Fallacy?’, Journal of political 
economy 94 (1986), 185-99, 185-99; G. Selgin, ‘Salvaging Gresham's Law: The Good, the Bad, and 
the Illegal.’, Journal of money, credit, and banking 28 (1996), 637-49. Strobel misinterprets 
Gresham’s law (K. Strobel, ‘Geldwesen un Währungsgeschichte des Imperium Romanum im Spiegel 
der Entwicklung des 3. Jahrhunderts n. Chr.’, K. Strobel (ed.), Die Ökonomie des Imperium Romanum. 
Strukturen, Modelle und Wertungen im Spannungsfeld von Modernismus und Neoprimitivismus 
(Stuttgart 2002), 94). For Roman legal tender laws see Arrianus, Epictetus 3.3.3 ; Sententiae Pauli 
5.25. 
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 R.Z. Aliber, ‘Gresham’s law, asset preferences and the demand for international reserves’, The 
quarterly journal of economics 81 (1967), 629 n. 3. 
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half of the century. Papyri show price stability until ca. 274 CE, while inscriptions indicate 
that at least until the 250’s there was no structural inflation in the west.28 The presence in 
hoards until the 260’s of denarii alongside antoniniani and Antonine and early Severan 
denarii alongside younger denarii, indicates that it was not worthwhile for private persons to 
melt down these coins and consequently that the price of silver bullion had not (yet) surged. 
The absence of inflation despite Gresham’s law is noteworthy, but not astounding. It indicates 
that price levels were little dependent on changes in the silver currency. In part the huge 
purchasing power locked in gold currency may have acted as a stabiliser. Probably more 
important is that currency inflation is a form of demand inflation, while pre-industrial 
economies were predominantly supply economies. Demand was usually inelastic; most 
consumers had little surplus to spend and transportation costs were high. Supply on the other 
hand was unpredictable and often irregular. Crop failures, heavy weather disrupting trade 
lines, epidemics, droughts etc. shook prices continuously.  
Exchange rates 
Dio confirms that the face value of the aureus under Alexander Severus was still 25 denarii.29 
Whether Gordian upgraded the face value of the ‘antonine’ aurei when he introduced his own 
light-weight aureus, is not known. Some inscriptions from Nubia seem to imply that the 
aureus under Philip was sold at 43.75 denarii. But they are too untypical to carry much 
weight.30  
However, the practice of ‘fixed exchange rates’ is not clear cut. An official rate of 16 assaria 
to a denarius is attested for Cibyra in 74 CE and for Syros under Severus.31 In Pergamon 
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 S. Mrozek, Prix et rémunération dans l’occident Romain (31 av. n.è. – 250 de n.è.) (Gdansk 1975), 
103-126 ; H.-U. von Freyberg, Kapitalverkehr und Handel im römischen Kaiserreich (27 v. Chr. – 235 
n. Chr.) (Freiburg im Breisgau 1988), 84-87 ; on prices doubling in late 2nd c. Egypt: D. Rathbone, 
‘Monetisation, not price-inflation, in third-century A.D. Egypt?’, C. E. King and D. G. Wigg, Coin 
finds and coin use in the Roman world (13th Oxford Symposium on coinage and monetary history, 
1993) (Berlin 1996), 334-335 ; Christiansen 2004, op.cit. (n. 3), 112-113. 
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 Dio, Historiae Romanae 55.12.4-5; T.V. Buttrey, ‘Dio, Zonaras and the value of the Roman 
aureus’, Journal of Roman Studies 51 (1961), 40-45; Wolters 1999, op.cit. (n. 1), 346; Harl 1996, 
op.cit. (n. 7), 127. 
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 CIG 5008 ; 5010; Harl 1996, op.cit. (n. 7), 133; Callu 1969, op.cit. (n. 15), 445; S. Bolin, State and 
currency in the Roman Empire to 300 A.D. (Stockholm 1958), 278-281; Christiansen 2004, op.cit. (n. 
3), 47; Rathbone 1996, op. cit. (n. 28), 337 n. 43. 
31
 Cibyra: IGRR IV, 915 (= J. R. Melville Jones, Testimonia Numaria. Greek and Latin Texts 
concerning Ancient Greek Coinage. Vol. I: Texts and translations (London 1993), no. 374) ; Syros: IG 
XII, 5 nos. 659 ; 663 ; 664 ; 665. 
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under Hadrian, bankers bought denarii for 17 assaria, and sold them for 18.32 In Ephesus in 
104 CE, an inscription stipulating handouts from the proceeds of an endowment, reckoned the 
denarius as 18 assaria, making a special provision in case the kollybos would rise. 
Apparently, loans out of the endowment were expressed in denarii, which would be changed 
into assaria for the smaller hand-outs.33  These cases suggest that the ‘official’ rate of the 
denarius in Asia and the Aegean was 16 assaria, but that bankers charged a commission 
(kollybos) of 1 to 2 assaria, which could be anticipated in private transactions. 
A Transylvanian tablet from 167 CE implies a denarius trading at 20 asses, another mentions 
a sum of 1/24 denarius.34 The Gnomon of the Idios Logos forbids ‘a coin to be changed for 
more than it is worth’.35 Yet the Egyptian tetradrachm circulated at rates fluctuating between 
24-30 bronze obols. In official transactions 28-30 obols was customary.36 
The aureus was officially worth 100 Egyptian drachmae, but P.Sarap 90 (ca. 108 CE) 
mentions aurei which used to be sold for 15 drachmae, being sold for 11.37 Presumably, the 
Ptolemaic custom of imposing surcharges on payments in silver for prices expressed in gold, 
still existed in the Roman period.38 
The available data on divergent inter-currency rates come from areas where provincial bronze 
and silver were dominant. Ratios in Italy are likely to have been closer to the official rates. 
However, reality was probably not fundamentally different. 
Scaevola mentions the case of a banker’s client wishing to close his account. The banker 
acknowledged owing him 380,000 sesterces plus interest and a separate sum of aurei, which 
would be refunded without interest. Scaevola’s words, summa aureorum quam (not aureos 
                                                 
32
 OGIS 484 ; Melville Jones 1993, op.cit. (n. 31), no. 579; R. Bogaert, Banques et banquiers dans les 
cités grecques (Leiden 1968), 231-234. 
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 Ancient Greek inscriptions in the British Museum III, 481, ll. 144-148. 
34
 CIL III, p. 950; p. 1058, 2215 (= FIRA III, p. 481-482, no. 157); cf. M.H. Crawford, ‘Money and 
exchange in the Roman World’, Journal of Roman Studies 60 (1970), 43. 
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 Nªovºmisma pleon ouvJ·k‚ ijscuvei oujªk ejxo;ºn keªrºmativzein; W.G. Uxkull-Gyllenband, Der Gnomon 
des Idios Logos (Berlin 1934), 103-104. 
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 D. Rathbone, ‘Prices and price formation in Roman Egypt’, J. Andreau, P. Briant and R. Descat 
(eds.), Economie antique. Prix et formation des prix dans les économies antiques (Saint-Bertrand-de-
Comminges 1997), 189. 
37
 = P.Bad. 37 ; cf. also P.Sarap 89c. See W. Weiser, ‘Nomisma exitelon und nummi restituti. Die 
Währungspolitik des Traianus (98-117) in Realität und moderner Fiktion’, Zeitschrift für Papyrologie 
und Epigraphik 125 (1999), 236; Strobel 2002, op.cit. (n. 26), 90. 
38
 R. Bogaert, ‘Les banques affermées Ptolémaïques’, Historia 33 (1984), 186; in 3rd c. BCE epallagè 
was 11.11% for trichrysa, and 4% on mnaieia and pentakontadrachma. 
Postprint version 10 
quos), indicate that the sum in gold was not a closed deposit but a normal bank deposit. 
Apparently, the banker kept separate accounts for sums in gold and sums in bronze and silver, 
implying that they had to be handled differently.39 Paulus notes that a creditor could not be 
forced to accept payment in a different ‘form’ of coins (aliam formam) if this would be to his 
detriment.40 
Obviously, face values remained fixed. Florentinus claims stipulations were valid if the 
promised sum equalled the stipulated sum, even if the former was expressed in aurei and the 
latter in denarii.41 
In stead of thinking in terms of a fixed exchange rate, therefore, we should think in terms of a 
guaranteed nominal value, above which a premium could be set, linked to the commission 
charged by exchange banks. Exchange commissions in Pergamon were fixed by the city, but 
there was clearly no general rule. P.Sarap 90 shows strategoi could intervene to check 
excesses, but they did so on an ad hoc basis. 
The existence of variable inter-currency commissions and premiums helps to explain the 
strength of the Augustan system. Fluctuations in bullion value could easily be smoothed out. 
When the silver currency degraded, exchange commissions (the ‘price’ of gold coin) may 
simply have risen.  
A crucial role was played by bankers. As long as bankers could be relied upon to accept coins 
at face value plus a reasonable commission, the actual bullion value of coins was irrelevant. 
The administration did not have the means to enforce nominal values in private transactions, 
but control on professional bankers was easy. Not coincidentally, the Athenian legal tender 
law of 375/4 BCE focused on dokimastai.42 In Rome as well in 85 BCE Gratidianus focused 
on nummularii to remedy a monetary crisis.43  
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 Digesta 2.14.47.1. 
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‘“Ancient greenbacks”: Athenian owls, the law of Nikophon, and the Greek economy’,  Historia 54 
(2005), 359-381. 
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 cf. Verboven 1994, op.cit. (n. 2); Lo Cascio 1996, op. cit. (n. 1), 278-279; M.H. Crawford, ‘The 
edict of M. Marius Gratidianus’, Proceedings of the Cambridge philological society n.s. 14 (1968), 1-
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Currency discontent 
A famous papyrus from Oxyrhynchus from 260 CE shows exchange bankers closing in order 
to avoid having to change the ‘imperial money’. The strategos ordered the exchange bankers 
to reopen and accept all genuine coins and warned businessmen to do the same.44 In 266 CE 
we find for the first time transactions being expressed in ‘ptolemaeic’ or ‘old silver’ as 
opposed to ‘new silver’.45 ‘Commodian’ tetradrachms now begin to turn up in significant 
numbers in hoards. 
There is no indication, however, that ‘old’ silver circulated at a premium. One papyrus (from 
289 CE) indicates that at least in some cases loans expressed in ‘Ptolemaic’ silver could be 
repaid in the same amount of ‘new’ silver.46 
These data indicate discontent with the debased currency of Gallienus and his successors. As 
the heterogeneity of the currency increased, bankers found it increasingly difficult to buy gold 
and ‘old’ silver. Presumably, local regulations limited their possibility to raise exchange 
commissions.  
Aurelian 
Around 274 CE papyri document a sudden tenfold increase in prices.47 The change is so 
abrupt and huge that it cannot have been merely an Egyptian phenomenon. Remarkably, 
prices afterwards again stabilised until Diocletian’s reform in 296 CE. Bankers and money-
lenders as well continue to appear in papyri. 
Such a phenomenal leap preceded and followed by price stability, cannot seriously be 
attributed to inflation. It indicates a devaluation by imperial decree and must be tied to 
Aurelian’s currency reform. Many theories have been made about this reform, particularly 
concerning the meaning of the XXI mark on the new silver-clad radiate (the aurelianianus) 
and its relation to the aureus. The source material is too meagre and ambiguous to go into to 
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these theories here. Most likely, however, the face value of the aureus was drastically altered, 
perhaps with the additional prevision that inter-currency commissions and premiums would 
fluctuate according to weight. The XXI mark as well probably refers to a new face value 
attributed to the antoninianus. 
Aurelian’s reform heralded a new era. From now on, the central denomination in the 
monetary system, was not a silver coin – however much debased – but a silver-clad coin. The 
system he devised was not merely a quantitative improvement of the horrible coinage of the 
250-260’s, but was a qualitatively different system, with different nominal values and 
exchange rates.  
Significantly, however, Aurelian did not change the material aspects of currency or exchange 
practices. His new radiates appeared simply as an improvement on the radiates in circulation, 
his aureus as an improvement on those in circulation. 
The monetary stability documented in the Egyptian papyri between 275-296 CE shows that 
the reform worked. Although it undoubtedly impoverished those who had savings in silver or 
bronze, it did not affect those with savings in gold or kind. Whether it succeeded in drawing 
back gold currency into circulation – if that was the intention – is hard to tell. Stray finds of 
aurei minted since the 260’s appear to increase, which might indicate an increased circulation 
since the 270’s. But, the numbers are too low to constitute more than a hint.48 
Diocletian 
The breakdown of monetary stability came only after Diocletian’s reforms.  Curiously the 
Price Edict lists gold coin as a commodity, setting a maximum price of 72,000 d.c. per pound 
(1200 d.c. per aureus). This doesn’t imply that gold coins did not enjoy a guaranteed nominal 
value, but that exchange commissions and surcharges were allowed to fluctuate. Perhaps the 
provision was intended to prevent competition between the old and new aurei. 
The half-hearted attempt to reintroduce the neronian denarius – now called argenteus – which 
had been so successful before, and the choice made in favour of the silver-clad nummus, 
which replaced Aurelian’s radiate as the central denomination, is remarkable. To argue that 
mass production of the nummus required so much silver, that not enough was left for the 
argenteus, is circular reasoning. Why didn’t Diocletian opt for the Augustan solution, 
combining a high value argenteus, with supplementary denominations in bronze ? 
                                                 
48
 Bland 1996, op.cit. (n. 6), 91. 
Postprint version 13 
Whatever the details of the reform, monetary instability ensued; inflation soared. In 301 
Diocletian reacted by fixing maximum prices and issuing a currency decree doubling the face 
value of at least the argenteus and the nummus. Both attempts failed miserably. 
Why did a reform that produced intrinsically more valuable and more handsome coins turn so 
fast into total disaster ? The main difference with Aurelian’s reforms is that Diocletian 
completely threw over board the existing currency system. Familiar radiate ‘silver’ largely 
disappeared in the imperial melting-pots. The neronian denarius had disappeared too long ago 
to lend trust to the argenteus, while the nummus was virtually an innovation ex nihilo. The 
public reacted by hoarding the argenteus because of its silver-purity, and avoiding or 
discounting the nummus because of its obvious overvaluation. Both features had existed 
previously, in the Augustan system (the pure silver denarius) and the Aurelian system (the 
silver-clad radiate), but never as parts of a single currency system. The reform failed because 
it lacked the support of tradition and habit. 
Ghent, August 2006 
